Peter, Your comments about Mearsheimer reflect a complete ahistorical understanding of international relations, agreements and arrangements over the last 55 years.
Wayne if you are going to charge anyone with “ahistorical understanding”, you really need to provide some specifics. Otherwise, this kind of talk is just empty waffle, the kind of trope often thrown around in academia, along with “lacking nuance”, or “historically flattened” to mask the lack of anything substantive.
On the matter of historical perspective, it is worth bearing in mind that the initial driver of NATO expansion was not the US or NATO aggressively pushing it (or “shoving it down Russia’s throat”, as Mearsheimer likes to put it). It was the “desperate entreaties” of the of the newly freed states in eastern and central Europe to be admitted, according to Mary Sarotte, author of the definitive account of the post-Cold War NATO expansion.
Why were these states so worried, even during the relatively optimistic Yeltsin years when most in the West thought Russia’s democratic transformation was secure? Well, having been under the Russian heel for prolonged periods, in some cases for centuries, the leaders of these nations were not so sure. They perceived developments, both internal to Russia and its external behaviour, that gave ground for concern.
These included the insertion of Russian troops into the Transnistria region of Moldova in 1992, where they have remained ever since despite Moldova adopting a formal policy of non-alignment in 1994. There was the extremely brutal conduct of the Chechen wars, the second during Putin’s tenure. And then there was the effective takeover of the Russian state by the security agencies (the siloviki), culminating in former KGB lieutenant-colonel Putin’s rise to the presidency in 2000.
This led to a widespread sense of unease, a sense that the Russian imperial impulse had not been expunged, but was in remission and may well re-emerge, a view that sadly has been well and truly confirmed by subsequent events. These are countries with a huge amount of skin in the game, and a far better insight into Russian behaviour grounded in long historical experience, than the likes of Mearsheimer or Sachs.
By the way, Sachs is an even worse apologist for Putin than Mearsheimer. I recall a recent interview where he was asked about the Russian presidential “election” in March of this year. Rather than call it out for the sham it clearly was, with Putin’s main potential opponent perishing in an Arctic Prison camp, and any credible alternative excluded, all Sachs could say was the election was “very Russian.” I attach no credence whatsoever to anything this bloke has to say.
I think your argument is well sustained and exposes weaknesses in Mearsheimer's work very well. I for one am pleased you have taken the trouble to set it out in some detail. One small point is that the different assessments he makes of the Russian and Israeli wars has one thing in common; namely, he sees his own country as invariably culpable notwithstanding his inconsistent treatment of each case. More importantly, military aggression is always an exercise in "might is right" irrespective of how it is justified, as the victor secures an outcome that may not have been possible by other means. In this sense, it is largely irrelevant as to whether one believes Russia was unreasonably "provoked" in its decision to invade Ukraine, or not. Like you, I think this argument is nonsense, but unlike you I think it is no more than a propagandist's side-show and is of little if any real consequence, as the more important issue is whether Russia prevails or secures some longer term advantage as a result of its military incursion into Ukraine. Similar considerations apply in the case of other wars, including that between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Once a war begins, the only thing that really matters is who wins.
Thanks Mark, I appreciate your comment. I was motivated to go into Mearsheimer’s positions and arguments out of annoyance with the way he is treated as an oracle by figures from the left to the right, and many points in between, as he espouses a position that amounts to a positive endorsement of Putin’s actions. And, as you point out, he is quite prepared to ditch his own theory in pursuit of what seems his primary concern—to blame the West, and the US in particular, for all the world’s ills.
You are right to stress the propagandistic nature of these arguments, but unfortunately these days propaganda can have a bearing on military outcomes if it undermines US and Western support for Ukraine and Israel. The informational sphere of warfare has never been more important.
“A state it is not, and hopefully never will be, but Hamas together with other Iranian terrorist proxies, as well as Iran itself, do pose a genuinely existential risk to Israel, having launched an extraordinarily vicious attack on its people, with the stated intention that this be the first of many such attacks, having the ultimate goal of annihilating Israel and exterminating or driving out its Jewish inhabitants.”
1. Hamas is just the latest organised resistance from the Palestinians over a 70 year occupation of their land. If you were placed under occupation in an apartheid concentration camp, subjected to periodic assaults, rapes and murder of your men, women and children you might not like Israelis. In additions thousands of your men, women and children held in arbitrary detention and treated like animals, you might not be too happy about living next door to Israelis. Hamas is the only defence that ordinary Palestinians have to defend their human rights and the weapons the posses and military might is a joke compared to the sophisticated military might of Israel.
“Mearsheimer stated Russia would not attack the Baltic states because they were in NATO, but when the interviewer suggested that therefore this was a good thing, Mearsheimer denied it. He really thinks they should be subservient to Moscow! And yet, Mearsheimer dismisses suggestions Putin has any imperial ambitions. He is confident of this because Putin has said so, publicly, and such declarations should be believed since state leaders (those undifferentiated billiard balls) rarely lie, at least to foreign audiences. Has it escaped his attention that practically everything Putin has said about Ukraine has been a lie, not least the denials he had any intention to invade until invasion day? Putin has had imperial aspirations for Russia for at least three decades and sees himself following in the footsteps of his hero, Peter the Great.”
1. Yes Russia wouldn’t attack the Baltic states as they are in NATO and Mearsheimer knows this as a realist. How many American politicians have excused Israel in its genocide in Gaza ? Peter come on your a former state and federal Labor politician, how many of them always told the truth? There is no evidence to sustain your assertion that Putin intends to invade other countries or even wants to invade all of the Ukraine and incorporate it into Russia.
“There is no evidence to sustain your assertion that Putin intends to invade other countries or even wants to invade all of the Ukraine and incorporate it into Russia.”
See Chapters 2 and 8 for extensive evidence on both these points
“However offensive realism is a poor theory, especially in an age of personalist autocracies in which the leader sits at the apex of a “power vertical” surrounded by supplicants terrified of telling him anything he does not want to hear. In his latest book, Mearsheimer insists that the requirement for such a deliberative process was met in the leadup to Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine, his sole evidence being an uncorroborated statement to this effect by foreign minister Sergey Lavrov.”
1. To assume that there are no checks and balances on Putin’s personal political power is ludicrous. Putin has political opposition internally within Russia and the Russian military have more independent control and scope to act, than you give them credit.
“To assume that there are no checks and balances on Putin’s personal political power is ludicrous. Putin has political opposition internally within Russia.”
“Assesses Mearsheimer’s hopelessly incoherent treatment of these matters. Despite eschewing what he regards as empty moralizing—in his theory, he makes no distinction between “good” and “bad” states (his scare quotes). Notwithstanding this, he is prepared to assign sole blame for the Ukraine war to the West and effectively absolve Putin, seemingly unaware blame is an inherently moral concept. How so? Because, he says, the West “caused” the war, by expanding NATO, as if starting a major war was the only option open to Putin. In any case, given Mearsheimer’s insistence that great powers should maximize their strategic advantage, what was wrong with the US and the West grasping the opportunity to expand NATO when they had the opportunity? “
1. Mearsheimer doesn’t support Russia’s aggression he understands and explains why it happened like Jeffery Sachs. If the Soviet Union had placed nuclear missiles in Cuba do you think the USA would have been happy?. We are both are old enough to know what happened there in 1963, the Soviet Union backed down and showed commonsense. Poland has nuclear weapons, the Ukraine wants nuclear weapons, why would Russia be happy about being encircled by nations armed by the USA ?
“Mearsheimer doesn’t support Russia’s aggression he understands and explains why it happened”.
Yes, he does justify it. He asserts that Putin’s actions are both rational and warranted, and he has never uttered a word of criticism of them. Mearsheimer is emphatic that his theory of international relations, which he invokes in this context, is both descriptive and prescriptive. See Chapters 3 and 6.
“Putin did not have any real agency. Like a billiard ball, he was caused to respond to the West’s “provocation” by starting a major land war. The poor fellow could do no other. In his tomes on international relations, Mearsheimer offers no credible defence of this absurd doctrine. In the real world, states are not homogenous, like billiard balls. They vary enormously in terms of system of governance—liberal democracy, one-party dictatorship, theocratic rule, military dictatorship, and most saliently, “personalist” autocracies dominated by single dictator—and contra Mearsheimer, this has an enormous bearing on how they behave in the international system.”
1. Mearsheimer doesn’t excuse Putin’s aggression, he just gives us an understanding and explanation like Sachs, why Russia behaved as it did. Mearsheimer theory goes beyond left/ right , libertarian/ socialist. democratic / authoritarian dichotomies in understanding socio economic political systems. Mearsheimer is a subscriber to a Neo-Hobbesian international state power political philosophy, that transcends those familiar dichotomies.
“Military aggression, he thinks, is an underrated tool of statecraft, and certainly warranted to counter a perceived deterioration in a country’s strategic position. or even to exploit opportunities to enhance its power. This is how he justifies the brutal and illegal Russian attacks on Ukraine, contending they are both rational and warranted.”
1. Mearsheimer believes that most states want to maximise their power, to ensure their growth and survival. His view is that no state wants to be seen as weak, because it will be seen as vulnerable. Mearsheimer is no dove but he doesn’t always believe that military aggression is the only solution to international problems. He understands why Putin invaded the Ukraine, but doesn’t support its aggression.
Mearsheimer advocates that great powers should maximize their relative power to the extent of becoming hegemonic AND that military force is a legitimate way to secure this result, including what he calls “wars of opportunity.” See Chapter 3.
“Mearsheimer’s role as a high-profile international affairs academic who is prepared to not just criticize Western policy, and excuse Russian behaviour, but to defend it as both rational and strategically warranted. Over forty years ago, the KGB defector Yuri Bezmenov stressed that pro-Russian advocacy by a credible Westerner is vastly more effective than when it comes from an identifiable Russian source. It is generally acknowledged that the informational dimension of warfare has never been as important as it is now. “
1. Right from the start I want to say that I don’t subscribe to the Realist Theory of International Relations, although I can see that Mearsheimer has been eerily correct in his international predictions. Mearsheimer has never excused Russian aggression or war crimes. The realist theory that Mearsheimer adheres to explains carefully why Russia invaded the Ukraine. He gives a good history of the agreements and arrangements after the dismantlement of the Soviet Union, where the USA and its allies, didn’t honour those agreements and arrangements. If Russia had been allowed to join NATO in the Clinton era, the war in the Ukraine might never have happened. Internationally reknowned economist Jeffery Sachs who was involved in the rebuilding of the Russian economy understands with Mearsheimer, why Russia invaded the Ukraine, although he isn’t a subscriber to the realist theory of international relations. Your use of a Cold War Russian to argue that we mustn’t let Russia get away with aggression doesn’t cut ice today, because we are in a totally different international era.
“I can see that Mearsheimer has been eerily correct in his international predictions.”
Really? This is the bloke who predicted in 1990 that the end of the Cold War would have Germany, Britain, France, and other European democracies at each other’s throats again like in olden times, including Germany invading eastern Europe (see Chapter 3). In 2015, he confidently asserted that Putin would never try to conquer Ukraine, and then on 24 February 2024 he did just that (though he continues with ludicrous attempts at denial—see Chapter 2).
Peter, Your comments about Mearsheimer reflect a complete ahistorical understanding of international relations, agreements and arrangements over the last 55 years.
See https://youtu.be/uvFtyDy_Bt0?si=Pn03jtnNEUO7H2bH for a more informed discussion with both John Mearsheimer and Jeffery Sachs.
Wayne if you are going to charge anyone with “ahistorical understanding”, you really need to provide some specifics. Otherwise, this kind of talk is just empty waffle, the kind of trope often thrown around in academia, along with “lacking nuance”, or “historically flattened” to mask the lack of anything substantive.
On the matter of historical perspective, it is worth bearing in mind that the initial driver of NATO expansion was not the US or NATO aggressively pushing it (or “shoving it down Russia’s throat”, as Mearsheimer likes to put it). It was the “desperate entreaties” of the of the newly freed states in eastern and central Europe to be admitted, according to Mary Sarotte, author of the definitive account of the post-Cold War NATO expansion.
Why were these states so worried, even during the relatively optimistic Yeltsin years when most in the West thought Russia’s democratic transformation was secure? Well, having been under the Russian heel for prolonged periods, in some cases for centuries, the leaders of these nations were not so sure. They perceived developments, both internal to Russia and its external behaviour, that gave ground for concern.
These included the insertion of Russian troops into the Transnistria region of Moldova in 1992, where they have remained ever since despite Moldova adopting a formal policy of non-alignment in 1994. There was the extremely brutal conduct of the Chechen wars, the second during Putin’s tenure. And then there was the effective takeover of the Russian state by the security agencies (the siloviki), culminating in former KGB lieutenant-colonel Putin’s rise to the presidency in 2000.
This led to a widespread sense of unease, a sense that the Russian imperial impulse had not been expunged, but was in remission and may well re-emerge, a view that sadly has been well and truly confirmed by subsequent events. These are countries with a huge amount of skin in the game, and a far better insight into Russian behaviour grounded in long historical experience, than the likes of Mearsheimer or Sachs.
By the way, Sachs is an even worse apologist for Putin than Mearsheimer. I recall a recent interview where he was asked about the Russian presidential “election” in March of this year. Rather than call it out for the sham it clearly was, with Putin’s main potential opponent perishing in an Arctic Prison camp, and any credible alternative excluded, all Sachs could say was the election was “very Russian.” I attach no credence whatsoever to anything this bloke has to say.
Hello Peter
I think your argument is well sustained and exposes weaknesses in Mearsheimer's work very well. I for one am pleased you have taken the trouble to set it out in some detail. One small point is that the different assessments he makes of the Russian and Israeli wars has one thing in common; namely, he sees his own country as invariably culpable notwithstanding his inconsistent treatment of each case. More importantly, military aggression is always an exercise in "might is right" irrespective of how it is justified, as the victor secures an outcome that may not have been possible by other means. In this sense, it is largely irrelevant as to whether one believes Russia was unreasonably "provoked" in its decision to invade Ukraine, or not. Like you, I think this argument is nonsense, but unlike you I think it is no more than a propagandist's side-show and is of little if any real consequence, as the more important issue is whether Russia prevails or secures some longer term advantage as a result of its military incursion into Ukraine. Similar considerations apply in the case of other wars, including that between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Once a war begins, the only thing that really matters is who wins.
Thanks Mark, I appreciate your comment. I was motivated to go into Mearsheimer’s positions and arguments out of annoyance with the way he is treated as an oracle by figures from the left to the right, and many points in between, as he espouses a position that amounts to a positive endorsement of Putin’s actions. And, as you point out, he is quite prepared to ditch his own theory in pursuit of what seems his primary concern—to blame the West, and the US in particular, for all the world’s ills.
You are right to stress the propagandistic nature of these arguments, but unfortunately these days propaganda can have a bearing on military outcomes if it undermines US and Western support for Ukraine and Israel. The informational sphere of warfare has never been more important.
“A state it is not, and hopefully never will be, but Hamas together with other Iranian terrorist proxies, as well as Iran itself, do pose a genuinely existential risk to Israel, having launched an extraordinarily vicious attack on its people, with the stated intention that this be the first of many such attacks, having the ultimate goal of annihilating Israel and exterminating or driving out its Jewish inhabitants.”
1. Hamas is just the latest organised resistance from the Palestinians over a 70 year occupation of their land. If you were placed under occupation in an apartheid concentration camp, subjected to periodic assaults, rapes and murder of your men, women and children you might not like Israelis. In additions thousands of your men, women and children held in arbitrary detention and treated like animals, you might not be too happy about living next door to Israelis. Hamas is the only defence that ordinary Palestinians have to defend their human rights and the weapons the posses and military might is a joke compared to the sophisticated military might of Israel.
I address these claims comprehensively in Chapter 11
“Mearsheimer stated Russia would not attack the Baltic states because they were in NATO, but when the interviewer suggested that therefore this was a good thing, Mearsheimer denied it. He really thinks they should be subservient to Moscow! And yet, Mearsheimer dismisses suggestions Putin has any imperial ambitions. He is confident of this because Putin has said so, publicly, and such declarations should be believed since state leaders (those undifferentiated billiard balls) rarely lie, at least to foreign audiences. Has it escaped his attention that practically everything Putin has said about Ukraine has been a lie, not least the denials he had any intention to invade until invasion day? Putin has had imperial aspirations for Russia for at least three decades and sees himself following in the footsteps of his hero, Peter the Great.”
1. Yes Russia wouldn’t attack the Baltic states as they are in NATO and Mearsheimer knows this as a realist. How many American politicians have excused Israel in its genocide in Gaza ? Peter come on your a former state and federal Labor politician, how many of them always told the truth? There is no evidence to sustain your assertion that Putin intends to invade other countries or even wants to invade all of the Ukraine and incorporate it into Russia.
“There is no evidence to sustain your assertion that Putin intends to invade other countries or even wants to invade all of the Ukraine and incorporate it into Russia.”
See Chapters 2 and 8 for extensive evidence on both these points
“However offensive realism is a poor theory, especially in an age of personalist autocracies in which the leader sits at the apex of a “power vertical” surrounded by supplicants terrified of telling him anything he does not want to hear. In his latest book, Mearsheimer insists that the requirement for such a deliberative process was met in the leadup to Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine, his sole evidence being an uncorroborated statement to this effect by foreign minister Sergey Lavrov.”
1. To assume that there are no checks and balances on Putin’s personal political power is ludicrous. Putin has political opposition internally within Russia and the Russian military have more independent control and scope to act, than you give them credit.
“To assume that there are no checks and balances on Putin’s personal political power is ludicrous. Putin has political opposition internally within Russia.”
Wayne, you cannot be serious.
“Assesses Mearsheimer’s hopelessly incoherent treatment of these matters. Despite eschewing what he regards as empty moralizing—in his theory, he makes no distinction between “good” and “bad” states (his scare quotes). Notwithstanding this, he is prepared to assign sole blame for the Ukraine war to the West and effectively absolve Putin, seemingly unaware blame is an inherently moral concept. How so? Because, he says, the West “caused” the war, by expanding NATO, as if starting a major war was the only option open to Putin. In any case, given Mearsheimer’s insistence that great powers should maximize their strategic advantage, what was wrong with the US and the West grasping the opportunity to expand NATO when they had the opportunity? “
1. Mearsheimer doesn’t support Russia’s aggression he understands and explains why it happened like Jeffery Sachs. If the Soviet Union had placed nuclear missiles in Cuba do you think the USA would have been happy?. We are both are old enough to know what happened there in 1963, the Soviet Union backed down and showed commonsense. Poland has nuclear weapons, the Ukraine wants nuclear weapons, why would Russia be happy about being encircled by nations armed by the USA ?
“Mearsheimer doesn’t support Russia’s aggression he understands and explains why it happened”.
Yes, he does justify it. He asserts that Putin’s actions are both rational and warranted, and he has never uttered a word of criticism of them. Mearsheimer is emphatic that his theory of international relations, which he invokes in this context, is both descriptive and prescriptive. See Chapters 3 and 6.
“Putin did not have any real agency. Like a billiard ball, he was caused to respond to the West’s “provocation” by starting a major land war. The poor fellow could do no other. In his tomes on international relations, Mearsheimer offers no credible defence of this absurd doctrine. In the real world, states are not homogenous, like billiard balls. They vary enormously in terms of system of governance—liberal democracy, one-party dictatorship, theocratic rule, military dictatorship, and most saliently, “personalist” autocracies dominated by single dictator—and contra Mearsheimer, this has an enormous bearing on how they behave in the international system.”
1. Mearsheimer doesn’t excuse Putin’s aggression, he just gives us an understanding and explanation like Sachs, why Russia behaved as it did. Mearsheimer theory goes beyond left/ right , libertarian/ socialist. democratic / authoritarian dichotomies in understanding socio economic political systems. Mearsheimer is a subscriber to a Neo-Hobbesian international state power political philosophy, that transcends those familiar dichotomies.
See response to previous comment.
“Military aggression, he thinks, is an underrated tool of statecraft, and certainly warranted to counter a perceived deterioration in a country’s strategic position. or even to exploit opportunities to enhance its power. This is how he justifies the brutal and illegal Russian attacks on Ukraine, contending they are both rational and warranted.”
1. Mearsheimer believes that most states want to maximise their power, to ensure their growth and survival. His view is that no state wants to be seen as weak, because it will be seen as vulnerable. Mearsheimer is no dove but he doesn’t always believe that military aggression is the only solution to international problems. He understands why Putin invaded the Ukraine, but doesn’t support its aggression.
Mearsheimer advocates that great powers should maximize their relative power to the extent of becoming hegemonic AND that military force is a legitimate way to secure this result, including what he calls “wars of opportunity.” See Chapter 3.
“Mearsheimer’s role as a high-profile international affairs academic who is prepared to not just criticize Western policy, and excuse Russian behaviour, but to defend it as both rational and strategically warranted. Over forty years ago, the KGB defector Yuri Bezmenov stressed that pro-Russian advocacy by a credible Westerner is vastly more effective than when it comes from an identifiable Russian source. It is generally acknowledged that the informational dimension of warfare has never been as important as it is now. “
1. Right from the start I want to say that I don’t subscribe to the Realist Theory of International Relations, although I can see that Mearsheimer has been eerily correct in his international predictions. Mearsheimer has never excused Russian aggression or war crimes. The realist theory that Mearsheimer adheres to explains carefully why Russia invaded the Ukraine. He gives a good history of the agreements and arrangements after the dismantlement of the Soviet Union, where the USA and its allies, didn’t honour those agreements and arrangements. If Russia had been allowed to join NATO in the Clinton era, the war in the Ukraine might never have happened. Internationally reknowned economist Jeffery Sachs who was involved in the rebuilding of the Russian economy understands with Mearsheimer, why Russia invaded the Ukraine, although he isn’t a subscriber to the realist theory of international relations. Your use of a Cold War Russian to argue that we mustn’t let Russia get away with aggression doesn’t cut ice today, because we are in a totally different international era.
“I can see that Mearsheimer has been eerily correct in his international predictions.”
Really? This is the bloke who predicted in 1990 that the end of the Cold War would have Germany, Britain, France, and other European democracies at each other’s throats again like in olden times, including Germany invading eastern Europe (see Chapter 3). In 2015, he confidently asserted that Putin would never try to conquer Ukraine, and then on 24 February 2024 he did just that (though he continues with ludicrous attempts at denial—see Chapter 2).